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Abstract 
This article considers some of the risks and challenges raised by the use of algorithm-
assisted decision-making and predictive tools by the public sector.  Alongside, it 
reviews a number of long-standing English administrative law rules designed to 
regulate the discretionary power of the state.  The principles of administrative law 
are concerned with human decisions involved in the exercise of state power and 
discretion, thus offering a promising avenue for the regulation of the growing number 
of algorithm-assisted decisions within the public sector.  This article attempts to re-
frame key rules for the new algorithmic environment and argues that ‘old’ law – 
interpreted for a new context – can help guide lawyers, scientists and public sector 
practitioners alike when considering the development and deployment of new 
algorithmic tools. 
Introduction 
In 1735, in this very journal, one Reverend Barrow published a short piece, hardly a 
page in length, in which he surveyed births, deaths and overall population in the 
parish of Stoke-Damerell in Devon. [1]  He notes that ‘the Number of Persons who 
died, is one more than half the Number of Children born; and that about 1 in 54 died’ 
in a year when the ‘General Fever’ infected almost all the inhabitants.  He further 
points out that one of the persons buried was ‘a Foreigner brought from on board a 
Dutch Ship’ and two more were drowned from on board a Man of War ‘but that the 
Ships Companies are not included in the Number of Inhabitants.’  This data, together 
with ‘Experience and Observations, both of my self and better Judges’ leads him to 
‘reckon the Parish of Stoke-Damerell as healthful an Air as any in England.’ 
Fifty-four years later, we find William Morgan (communicated by a Reverend Richard 
Price) promoting ‘the method of determining, from the real probabilities of life, the 
value of a contingent reversion in which three lives are involved in the survivorship.’ 
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[2]  In an age when prospects in society – and lines of credit - might be dependent on 
one’s ‘great expectations’ of an inheritance, calculating the probability of achieving 
that inheritance (known to lawyers as contingency reversion) becomes of great 
interest.  For instance, I might transfer a piece of land on the following basis: to my 
niece for her lifetime, remainder to my nephew and his heirs, but if my nephew dies 
in the lifetime of my niece, then the land reverts to me and my heirs;  I have a 
‘reversionary interest’ in the land.  The question for my eighteenth century nephew is 
how to value the sum that might be payable on the contingency that he will survive 
his sister.  The method and calculations proposed by Morgan are set out at length 
and in considerable detail so as to enable a reader to test and critique them.  To this 
author’s non-expert eye, two points are striking.  First, that the calculations appear to 
be based on group data i.e. on the number of persons living at the age of my nephew, 
and at the end of first year, second year, third year and so, from the age of my 
nephew.  Secondly, the article goes onto criticise a rule proposed by a certain ‘Mr 
Simpson’ and points to its results as deviating ‘so widely from the truth as to be unfit 
for use’ [my emphasis] in some cases producing ‘absurd’ results. 
 
A modern reader might be tempted to regard these articles as illustrations of a naïve 
age or to a context long past, or to highlight the lack of causal evidence for Reverend 
Barrow’s conclusion about the ‘healthful’ nature of his parish.  Yet both articles tackle 
issues with which we remain concerned today: the healthiness (or otherwise) of a 
community, the reasons behind it and the life expectancy of an individual when 
compared to others.  Risk forecasting and predictive techniques to aid decision-
making have become commonplace in our society, not least within public services 
such as criminal justice, security, benefit fraud detection, health, child protection and 
social care.  We should be better at it than our eighteenth century clergymen.  It has 
become almost unnecessary to say that we now inhabit an information society.  
Information technologies driven by the flow of digital data have become pervasive 
and everyday, often leading to the assumption that access to vast banks of (often 
individualised) digital data, combined with today’s networked computing power and 
complex algorithmic tools, will lead automatically to greater knowledge and insight, 
and so to better predictions.    
 
Knowledge, however, is not the same as information (as many before me have 
pointed out): Knowledge, Hassan argues, ‘emerges through the open and experiential 
and diverse (and often intuitive) working and interpreting of raw data and 
information.’ [3]  Reverend Barrow’s conclusion as to the healthfulness of his parish, 
for instance, was based, not only on the outcome of analysis of raw data, but on 
additional ‘experience and observations’ of himself and others.  Some criticise such 
human ‘intrusion’ on the data as casting further doubt on the conclusion.  Grove and 
Meehl, a leading proponent of the use of statistical, algorithmic methods of data 
analysis over clinical methods, argued that ‘To use the less efficient of two prediction 
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procedures in dealing with such matters is not only unscientific and irrational, it is 
unethical.  To say that the clinical-statistical issue is of little importance is 
preposterous.’ [4]  It is this often-claimed superiority, together with the potential for 
more consistent application of relevant factors often taken from large datasets, that 
give algorithmic tools their appeal in many public sector contexts.  Although this 
article is written from a legal perspective, it draws attention to arguments made in 
the ongoing ‘algorithmic predictions versus purely human judgement’ debate and 
applies these to the legal principles discussed below.  It is particularly concerned with 
algorithm-assisted decisions, whereby an algorithmic output, prediction or 
recommendation produced by machine learning technique is incorporated into a 
decision-making process requiring a human to approve or apply it.  ‘Machine learning 
involves presenting the machine with example inputs of the task that we wish it to 
accomplish.  In this way, humans train the system by providing it with data from 
which it will be able to learn.  The algorithm makes its own decision regarding the 
operation to be performed to accomplish the task in question.’ [5]  Machine learning 
algorithms are ‘probabilistic…their output is always changing depending on the 
learning basis they were given, which itself changes in step with their use.’ [5]  I will 
return to the important probabilistic characteristic of algorithmic outputs later. 
 
Predictive algorithms and administrative law 
The growth in the use of intensive computational statistics, machine-learning and 
algorithmic methods by the UK public sector shows no sign of abating. [6]  What then 
should be the role of the human when these tools are planned and then deployed, 
particularly when the accuracy of an algorithmic prediction is claimed to be at least 
comparable to the accuracy of a human one?  I consider this question by reference to 
a number of connected English administrative law rules, some of which (such as 
natural justice) date back to before the origins of this journal.  I have done this 
because this body of law governs the exercise of discretionary powers and duties by 
state bodies, and thus the humans working within them; discretion must be exercised 
within boundaries or the public body is acting unlawfully.  As Le Sueur explains, ‘The 
assumption made until comparatively recently is that the decision-maker using the 
executive power conferred by Parliament is a human being or an institution 
composed of humans and that there is a human who will be accountable and 
responsible for the decision.’ [7]  We see this today in witnesses called to give 
evidence to Parliamentary Select Committees.  The introduction of an algorithm to 
replace, or even only to assist, the human decision-maker represents a challenge to 
this assumption and thus to the rule of law, and the power of Parliament to decide 
upon the legal basis of decision-making by public bodies.  I argue below however that 
English administrative law – in particular the duty to give reasons, the rules around 
relevant and irrelevant considerations and around fettering discretion – is flexible 
enough to respond to many of the challenges raised by the use of predictive machine 
learning algorithms, and can signpost key principles for the deployment of algorithms 
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within public sector settings.  These principles, although derived from historic case-
law, have already been applied and refined to modern government, to the 
development of the welfare state, privatisation, the development of executive 
agencies and so on. 
 
I then attempt to re-frame each of these rules in order to suggest how they could 
guide future algorithm-assisted decision-making by public bodies affecting rights, 
expectations and interests of individuals.  In doing so, I do not recommend any 
particular method of building or interpreting these systems [8] - as to do so would 
require consideration of many different contexts and informational needs - but to 
suggest principles to guide those engaged in future development work.  I focus 
attention on the requirements of legitimate decision-making from the perspective of 
the public sector decision-maker, rather than from the perspective of the subject.  
Fair decision-making in accordance with administrative law rules by its very nature 
also protects the interests of the human subject of those decisions.  I argue that 
carefully considering exactly what the algorithm is or is not predicting, and explaining 
to the decision-maker at the point results are displayed, is key to ensuring this 
fairness.   
 
Opacity and algorithms  
In contrast to the calculations of William Morgan in 1789, disclosed at length in this 
journal, the opacity of many of today’s algorithmic tools has been much criticised, no 
more so than Equivant’s recidivism prediction tool COMPAS. [9]  Despite its 
deployment within the criminal justice system in the US, its workings are proprietary 
and remain secret.   
 
This is not always the case however.  In the UK, Durham Constabulary’s Harm 
Assessment Risk Tool (known as HART) is one of the first algorithmic tools deployed 
by a UK police force in an operational capacity.  It was designed to support custody 
officer decision-making as part of a programme called Checkpoint, which is an ‘out-
of-court’ disposal to help a sub-set of offenders tackle their individual problems, for 
example drug or alcohol addiction, and so enable them to desist from crime.  Durham 
Constabulary has been open about its development of the tool, the random forest 
method behind it, the input data, the first validation exercise and the challenges the 
tool raises in terms of officer decision-making. [10]   
 
In the US, the Allegheny Family Screening Tool, developed by Vaithianathan and 
Putnam-Hornstein ‘is owned by the county. Its workings are public. Its criteria are 
described in academic publications and picked apart by local officials. At public 
meetings held in downtown Pittsburgh before the system’s adoption, lawyers, child 
advocates, parents and even former foster children asked hard questions not only of 
the academics but also of the county administrators who invited them.’ [11]  
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Vaithianathan argues that transparency is never ‘done’: ‘It starts with engaging 
people potentially subject to and affected by the tool, and listening and responding 
to their concerns.  As the project continues, transparency should be revisited often to 
make sure that the tool is understandable to the community, agency and frontline 
workers.’ [12]  Transparency does not mean that criticism is sidestepped however 
[13] (and rightly so) but should mean that the resulting debate can be better 
informed. 
 
Yet even if input data and algorithmic method are disclosed, ‘the interplay between 
the two in the mechanism of the algorithm is what yields the complexity (and thus 
opacity).’ [14]  For instance, the risk prediction model created for Philadelphia’s 
parole department by the University of Pennsylvania is made up of 500 regression 
trees (with an example of one of them available in a public report), the same machine 
learning model as the Durham tool.  This report sets out the claimed benefits of this 
type of model as follows: 
‘The real power of random forest modeling ultimately lies in this extremely 
large number of separate nodes, along with the random selection of individual 
predictors to split them. This combination allows the influence of each 
predictor to be averaged over a wide variety of unique sub-samples throughout 
the model, and reduces the influence of any one particular tree to just one 
vote out of hundreds. Even if one particular branch or one entire tree proves to 
be somewhat inaccurate under certain conditions, therefore, its biases can 
easily be compensated for by the millions of other paths that cases take 
through the model as a whole.’ [15]  
 
This may be one of the benefits from a statistical point of view, but there is a trade-
off to be had in terms of understandability, even though everything is out in the 
open.  In the case of HART, there are over 4.2 million decision points, all of which are 
highly dependent on the ones that precede them in the tree structure. [10]  The 
needs of a public sector decision-maker, or of the human subject of algorithmic 
decisions, are unlikely to be met by an ‘information dump’ into the public domain.  As 
Guidotti et al. note, a step that is often missed is the identification of ‘properties that 
an explanation should guarantee.’ [16]  It is around these issues that ‘natural justice’ 
in administrative law can provide guidance.  
 
Natural justice, the duty to give reasons and applicability to algorithms 
Natural justice is concerned with procedural fairness, that is the control, and 
knowledge, of the procedure by which public bodies take action or make decisions.  
Although a clear understanding of the rules derived from case-law remains ‘elusive’, 
[17] it is well recognised that one of the principles of natural justice -  the right to be 
heard - at least requires a person to be informed of the ‘gist’ [18] of the case against 
them, so that they are equipped to make representations to the decision-maker.  
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(These principles are reflected in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the right to a fair trial).  In relation to the position post-decision, although the 
courts have consistently avoided imposing any general duty in administrative law to 
give reasons for decisions, ‘there is a strong case to be made for the giving of reasons 
as an essential element of administrative justice.’ [19]  This is particularly so where 
important rights or interests are concerned, such as personal liberty and where 
reasons would disclose a flaw in the decision-making process.  The courts have also 
been prepared to assess the adequacy of reasons given, through the processes of 
appeal or judicial review.  Sir Thomas Bingham MR asked in the case of Clarke Holmes 
whether the decision in question leaves room for ‘genuine doubt…as to what [the 
decision-maker] has decided and why.’ [20] [my emphasis]  In Porter, Lord Brown said 
in 1953:   
‘The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate.  
They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it 
was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important 
controversial issues’…The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt 
as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by 
misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by 
failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds.’ [21] [my emphasis] 
 
The incorporation of an algorithm into a decision-making process may come with the 
risk of creating ‘substantial’ or ‘genuine’ doubt as to why decisions were made and 
what conclusions were reached, both for the subject of the decision and the decision-
maker themselves.  The use of an algorithm is not likely to provide an excuse or 
justification for a lesser standard: Lord Carnwath stated in Dover District Council that 
‘the content of [the duty to give reasons] should not in principle turn on differences 
in the procedures by which it is arrived at.’ [22]  It could certainly be argued that, as 
the Doody decision held that a Home Secretary setting a tariff of imprisonment must 
show ‘how his mind is working’ [23], the same will be true of a human taking an 
algorithmically-informed decision.  It could even be said that the use of an opaque 
algorithm to generate an output informing a decision might obstruct the right to be 
heard if an individual is unable to understand the ‘gist’ of why the output was 
generated  and so present an alternative case, or if the 'learning' nature of the tool 
makes it difficult or impossible to recreate the original decision. 
 
Hildebrandt is concerned that the provision of information or explanations should not 
be mistaken for legal justification of a decision. [24]  She states as an illustration: 
‘When a court decides a case it cannot justify its decision by spelling out the 
heuristics of the judge(s) involved, such as their political preferences, what they had 
for breakfast or how they prepared the case.’ [24]  While it is certainly the case that 
explanation does not necessarily imply justification, a duty to give reasons so as to 
avoid ‘substantial doubt’ can reveal flaws in the process, the sort of error which 
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would allow the courts to intervene, and provide information required for audit and 
thus justification, or otherwise.  This should identify whether there was a 
disagreement between the human decision-maker and the algorithmic 
recommendation or prediction and if so, why the algorithmic recommendation was 
followed (if it was).  Evidence of ‘meaningful’ human involvement will be vital to 
demonstrate that a decision was not automated processing as defined by EU data 
protection law. [25]  Also, setting out the explanations for an individual prediction 
could reveal errors that have legal consequences, for instance leading to a public 
body acting outside its powers or unfairly.  At an earlier stage, a duty to provide the 
subject with the ‘gist’ of the factors weighing against them (in an algorithmic risk 
assessment for instance, the most important factors that informed the risk 
assessment) could enable the individual to argue the alternative during the process. 
[26]   
 
A higher standard for algorithms? 
In applying these requirements to algorithm-assisted decisions however, would we be 
unfairly requiring a higher standard of algorithms than we are of humans?  It is 
indeed the case that in many walks of life when we interact with the public sector, we 
defer to recommendations of humans without always requiring a detailed breakdown 
of why they have reached a particular recommendation, in the medical field for 
instance.  Yet those decisions are neither unjustifiable nor unexplainable.  The medic 
carries out her work within a regulated structure that involves training, certification 
and ongoing oversight, subject to a legal framework that allows decisions and actions 
to be challenged.  The fundamental principles around patient informed consent 
require a medic, inter alia, to inform the patient about the diagnosis, including any 
uncertainties: ‘If you recommend a particular treatment or course of action, you 
should explain your reasons for doing so.’ [27]  There may be reasons for not sharing 
information with patients (for instance around capacity, the risk of causing serious 
harm or patient wishes), but the medic must be prepared to explain and justify her 
decision not to share [27].  In any event, we would expect her to have sound reasons 
for the diagnosis and treatment recommendations, even if those are not explained in 
detail to the patient.   
 
Judges operate within established frameworks, in England & Wales one that regards 
judicial competence, independence and accountability - through appeal and scrutiny - 
as of crucial importance (and not just in England and Wales!). [28]  The famous study 
on judicial decision-making before lunch is often cited as evidence of the frailty of 
human judicial decisions and the influence of hidden factors, [29] although various 
criticisms of this study include one which focuses upon the overlooked factor of 
decision pattern, concluding that ‘the phenomenon of favourable decisions peaking 
after a meal break is likely an artefact of the order of case presentation.’ [30]  
Another concludes that the same effect could be produced by rational time-
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management factors. [31]  Pasquale and Cashwell dismiss the assertion that judicial 
opinions are more opaque than machine learning algorithms: ‘Unlike many 
proprietary or hopelessly opaque computational processes proposed to replace 
them, judges and clerks can be questioned and rebuked for discriminatory 
behaviour.’ [32]   
 
There remains the risk of course that post-event explanations or justifications of a 
human decision only partially represent the ‘real’ reasons.  But administrative law 
principles governing the way that state actors take decisions via human decision-
makers, combined with judicial review actions, evidential processes and the 
adversarial legal system are designed to counter this sort of practice.  The 
incorporation of the outputs of algorithmic tools, that may represent a ‘digital 
unconscious’ as Hildebrandt has put it [33], into a decision-making process will not be 
exempt from this oversight.   
 
Some forms of automation hold out promise for legal certainty - ‘like cases are 
treated identically, the elimination of bias, ensuring that no irrelevant considerations 
are taken into account, and that all relevant factors are included.’ [7]  Advances in 
medical AI could revolutionise the ability for medics to detect a patient’s long term 
trend ‘without wading into the data themselves.’ [34]  It does not follow from this, 
however, that there should be less provision made for understanding and querying 
outputs. [7]  Requiring algorithmic systems to provide explanations for their 
recommendations, suitable to each particular context, would make a positive 
contribution to the rule of law. [7]  Polson and Scott argue that one of the advantages 
of algorithms is that the biases of ‘human wetware’ i.e. the human brain, cannot be 
subjected to direct numerical scrutiny in the same way as algorithms, although they 
regard the secrecy around the COMPAS algorithm as ‘morally obscene.’ [34]  I would 
argue that it is not a higher standard that would be required by administrative law 
principles for algorithm-assisted decisions, but one that is adapted to the way that an 
algorithm-assisted decision is structured. 
 
Algorithms and intelligibility 
It would be a mistake to regard the law as disconnected from the aims and objectives 
of public authorities, somehow operating in a vacuum.  The system of administrative 
law is not a barrier or ‘antagonistic’ to efficient government  it is a ‘creative’ not 
destructive relationship, focused on improving the ‘technique’ of government, and 
thus the confidence of the citizen in its reasonableness and fairness. [19]  
Developments in algorithmic intelligibility and explainability can improve ‘techniques’ 
of government, and administrative law principles can inform the requirements for 
such intelligibility, an approach with fairness as its goal.  This goal seems in harmony 
with the aims of many in the data science field working on explanations for data-
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driven classifications.  Martens and Provost, in their article on explaining data-driven 
document classifications, argue that: 
‘We need research that focuses on a user-centric theoretical understanding of 
the production of explanations with a primary goal of improving data-driven 
models based on feedback and iterative development.  This is important 
because as model-based systems increasingly are built by mining models from 
large data, users may have much less confidence in the model’s reasoning than 
with hand-crafted knowledge-based systems.  There are likely to be many cases 
where the decisions are erroneous due either to biases in the process, or to 
over-fitting the training data.’ [35]  
 
Rather than a ‘passive recipient of explanations about why she is wrong about the 
world’, a user would see herself as an active part of the system development.  
Martens and Provost also identify the need to differentiate between the different 
roles of people interacting with the system in terms of the explanations provided, for 
instance the manager who may need to sign-off models or explain or justify models in 
the case of error. [35]   (Such ‘analytical quality assurance’ established by the senior 
accountable person is a requirement of HM Treasury’s ‘Aqua Book’, the guidance on 
producing quality analysis for government. [36])  
 
Martens and Provost are particularly concerned with explanations that can have an 
impact on improving the model as well as improving user acceptance.  What should 
the role of the human be, however, in circumstances when studies are said to show 
the superiority of statistical prediction? [37] [38]  Berk and Bleich comment that ‘one 
does not have to understand the future to forecast it with useful 
accuracy…Understanding a phenomena may lead to improved forecasting accuracy, 
or it may not, but forecasting and explanation are different enterprises that can work 
at cross-purposes.’ [39]   They question what a judge would do with an explanation as 
to why an individual was forecasted high or low risk. [39]   
 
Referring back to the principles of natural justice discussed above, one of the 
fundamental reasons why a judge (or other public sector decision-maker) would need 
an explanation regarding an algorithmic forecast is to determine whether or not 
there was a flaw in the overall decision-making process that had been informed by 
the algorithm, or indeed whether her own decision risks being affected by such a 
flaw.  In relation to pre-emptive policing, Hildebrandt warns ‘those meant to be pre-
empted are left in the dark, while those employing the predictive analytics have a 
hold on the steering wheel (though they are probably far less in control than they 
may be inclined to believe)’ [33]  Operating an algorithm-assisted process in 
accordance with administrative law principles may enable the public sector decision-
maker to keep control of the algorithmic ‘steering wheel’ and operate it in a lawful 
manner.   
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It is accepted that there is evidence to demonstrate that ‘When the data bases are 
identical, the findings have been uniform in showing that statistical combination of 
data is superior to clinical combination.’ [my emphasis] [37]  The responsible 
decision-maker must be the one to determine, however, whether the database used 
by the algorithm is indeed identical i.e. that it represents all the factors that should be 
taken into account (more on this below).  In addition, the human must determine 
whether the decision under consideration matches the one for which the algorithm 
was developed – for instance, an assessment of ‘risk’ may encompass much more 
than the forecast of a particular behaviour by an algorithm - and whether the data on 
which the algorithm was trained match the circumstances of the current situation.  
Polson and Scott comment ‘A machine can make predictions based on the 
assumptions with which it’s programmed, but only people can check those 
assumptions.’ [34]  Van Kleek et al. refer to algorithmic explanations as 'sensemaking' 
and explain the need for this as follows: 
'In order to grapple with value-laden decision-making, practitioners both 
individually and collectively need to build up mental models of the decision 
support systems that they work with.  These schemas allow for more nuanced 
evidence than the raw yes/no output from the algorithm.  In cases where 
algorithms are being used to make more open ended decisions, being able to 
spot situations where algorithmic output is expected to be flawed is of real 
value in shaping questions and further examination.  An example of this might 
be a predictive policing system exaggerating the risk of crime in an area 
immediately following a festival or carnival.  If operators understand (or infer) 
that the system makes use of incident rates from previous months, then they 
can interpret, or even predict, its output accordingly.' [40] 
 
Finally, as Barnes comments, ‘what are you going to do with the [predicted 
outcome]?...Once you have a red box on your computer screen that says high risk, 
now what?’ [41]  Appropriate knowledge as to why a prediction was generated will 
be necessary in order to decide upon the circumstances in which a prediction should 
be listened to, queried or overridden.  Furthermore, there is a logical step required 
between presenting a prediction and interpreting it as a risk. 
 
Properties of an explanation 
This is not to say that everyone involved in all stages of a decision-making process will 
require the same explanation regarding an algorithmic output.  There will be different 
‘properties’ or granularity that should be provided by an explanation dependent upon 
the context, the particular user and the likely weight of the outcome that the 
algorithmic output informs.  For instance in a policing context, management staff 
(responsible for ensuring that the tool is fit for purpose and for monitoring the 
legality of the force's actions) are likely to require more information about the long 
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term performance and accuracy of a tool when compared to a front-line officer 
dialling up a risk predictor in a confrontational operational situation.   
Putting aside whether there should always be some sort of base-line standard, Figure 
1 below attempts to illustrate the potential bearing on the granularity of reasons 
required of immediacy of decision and seriousness of outcome or effect (that is, the 
weight of the impact on rights or freedoms of individuals).   
 
Fig. 1 
 
 
In situation C (a police officer called out to a possible domestic violence situation), 
the officer may be required to decide rapidly as to whether or not to make an arrest.  
Providing the officer with details about the uncertainties of the output of any 
algorithmic decision-support tool or highlighting any borderline risk assessment may 
not contribute to the most effective decision-making process in those circumstances.  
Yet a decision either way informed by unreliable information could have significant 
consequences for both the offender and victim, suggesting that such details should 
be available to others within the organisation with oversight and management roles 
to ensure accountability.  In situation A, a decision about an individual’s application 
for parole can be taken in longer time.  As we have seen recently however from the 
case of convicted rapist John Worboys, it is one that can seriously infringe both a 
victim’s and offender’s rights and freedoms [42] and therefore the standard for 
algorithmic intelligibility should be commensurate with that high potential impact.  
Situation B represents the sort of public sector decision that could be informed by 
algorithms but which has a low immediacy and a low seriousness, in terms of the 
impact of the decision, and where there may be limited external factors to consider.  
The principles of natural justice and the duty to give reasons may have little 
applicability to such circumstances.  
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To conclude this section, in each algorithmic-assisted environment, a context-specific 
and nuanced approach will be required so that the information and explanations 
provided to aid intelligibility, or the way the result is interpreted, enable the 
particular public task to be fulfilled in a legitimate manner.  The design of 
interpretable tools should take into account both the requirements of natural justice 
and the practicalities of ‘the messy, socio-technical contexts in which they inevitably 
exist.’ [43]  As Christin has argued, we need to pay attention ‘to the actual rather than 
aspirational practices connected to algorithms.’ [44]  
 
Duty to give reasons – reframing for algorithm-assisted decision-making in the 
public sector 
The first of my suggested ‘re-framings’ focuses upon key factors within the right to be 
heard and duty to give reasons in order to suggest how they could guide future 
algorithm-assisted decision-making by public bodies: 
 
When an algorithmically generated prediction, recommendation or other output 
forms part of a decision-making process, consideration should be given to the 
circumstances in which reasons for/an explanation of the output may be required.  
These may include, inter alia: to determine whether the data on which the algorithm 
was trained match the circumstances of the current situation; the identification of 
situations where the output is likely to be flawed; where individual rights and 
freedoms are under consideration.  The properties or granularity that should be 
provided by an explanation will be dependent upon the context, the particular user 
requiring the explanation and the likely weight of the outcome that the algorithmic 
output informs.      
 
The next section will discuss irrelevant and relevant considerations.  Linked with the 
above, only if we know the grounds on which a decision has been taken, can we judge 
their relevance.  Reverend Barrow's  opinion as to the healthful nature of his parish 
was based upon data, together with ‘Experience and Observations, both of my self 
and better Judges.’ [1]  We have no further knowledge, however, of those 
experiences and observations, nor of the grounds on which they were made, nor of 
their weighting compared to the data, and therefore can make no meaningful 
assessment of them.  The grounds on which algorithmic predictions or 
recommendations are generated are commonly just as obscure, if not more so, than 
those relied upon by Reverend Barrow.  If such prediction or recommendation forms 
an important element of the decision-making process, how then can its lawfulness in 
terms of relevance or irrelevance be judged? 
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Irrelevant and relevant considerations  
Many administrative law cases are concerned with a public body’s alleged improper 
motives or where it has acted upon irrelevant considerations.  The doctrine was 
explained by Lord Esher MR as follows: 
‘If people who have to exercise a public duty by exercising their discretion take 
into account matters which the courts consider not to be proper for the 
exercise of their discretion, then in the eye of the law they have not exercised 
their discretion.’ [45] 
One of the most well-known cases is Venables where the Secretary of State had fixed 
a tariff for two boy murderers.  It was held that he had misdirected himself in taking 
account of public demands and newspaper campaigns when coming to his decision. 
[46] 
 
Relevancy and algorithms – data inputs/predictors 
Different definitions of ‘relevance’ are potentially in play.  Berk argues ‘if other things 
equal, shoe size is a useful predictor of recidivism, then it can be included as a 
predictor.  Why shoe size matters is immaterial.’ [39]  In this statement (I imagine 
made somewhat in jest!), we find a potentially significant area of friction between 
lawyers and data scientists.  Lawyers are likely to question whether shoe size would 
be a relevant consideration if a risk assessment was made via other means?  If it 
would not, should it be an input factor in an algorithmic assisted prediction?  Maybe 
though, lawyers are talking at cross-purposes with statistical experts.   Administrative 
law is concerned with situations where a public authority has acted upon irrelevant 
considerations or failed to take into account relevant ones, in relation to the power 
or duty being exercised, and so its action or decision is ultra vires, beyond its powers 
and therefore null and void.  Those working on algorithmic risk prediction tools are 
particularly concerned with the relevance – the statistical correlation - of a factor to 
model's predictive performance  Indeed Barnes and Hyatt comment ‘since there is 
little penalty for including additional predictors – even when they add little in the way 
of predictive power – a wide variety of different predictors can be used to construct 
these models.’ [15]   
 
Where there is only correlation between the factor and the output, and limited causal 
evidence, will the use of this factor be defensible if the output informs a decision by a 
public body, especially if removal of the factor affects accuracy of the tool?  Accuracy 
may though not be the overriding concern for all public bodies.  Multi-layered public 
policy considerations, such as community and social engagement, might outweigh the 
arguments in favour of including a factor, even if removing that factor reduces the 
accuracy of the tool.  Other legal duties imposed on public authorities, for example 
the Public Sector Equality Duty under the Equality Act 2010, will require a more 
holistic consideration of the impact of an algorithmic tool and how it might affect 
different groups in different ways.  In addition, the quality of the factor itself will be 
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significant to its defensibility.  We would all look aghast nowadays at the 1926 Court 
of Appeal judgment that upheld a decision to dismiss all married women teachers, on 
the basis that the discretion of the public authority in relation to the efficient 
maintenance of their schools had not been exceeded. [47]  How would we react 
however to inclusion of marriage as a predictor, perhaps not too far away from 
demographic predictors [10][15] or census poverty indicators [48] used in recent 
criminal justice models?  The developers of these particular tools are likely to argue 
that these factors are related to the purposes of the programmes of which the 
algorithmic tools are part (in the case of Durham’s HART tool for instance, to tackle 
the cycle of repeat offending in certain communities), even if direct evidence of 
causation may be lacking.  The courts have been prepared to allow public bodies a 
relatively wide discretion to take into account a range of legitimate factors in their 
decision-making and so may be reluctant to uphold a challenge in administrative law 
to the use of predictors – of itself -  that have an explainable (in terms of some degree 
of causation), non-biased and potentially justifiable link to the purpose in hand.  Use 
of shoe size is likely to be another matter! 
 
Relevancy and algorithms – outputs 
As further evidence becomes available in different environments as to algorithms’ 
accuracy in comparison with the human decision-maker, we may start to hear 
arguments that outputs should be regarded as relevant considerations, from a legal 
perspective, and indeed that public authorities should proactively seek out such 
algorithmic outputs.  The court in the Worboys challenge said that the parole board 
should have sought out further information as to the circumstances of his offending. 
[42]  Perhaps in the future such further information will always be expected to 
include an algorithmically generated risk assessment. 
 
A few notes of caution however:  a determination of relevancy could stand or fall on 
the tool’s performance in the live environment, the relative importance of extrinsic 
factors (discussed in the next section) or whether the model is predicting the right 
thing.  In terms of performance, a model that was trained on adult male offenders’ 
data for instance may have little relevance to female or juvenile offenders.  An output 
could be undermined, Cabitza et al. have argued, if inputs are based only on the 
values that have been proposed by a statistically significant majority in order to 
sweep ‘uncertainty under the carpet.’ [49]  Furthermore, a public body’s remit is 
often dependent on a subjective assessment (say ‘in the reasonable opinion’ of an 
official).  Take a hypothetical example of a government department which has been 
given a statutory power to intervene ‘if a child is reasonably determined to be at high 
risk of harm.’  The legality of its power to intervene is therefore dependent upon this 
assessment.  The government body might use an algorithm to help it decide on risk 
levels by way of textual analysis, of hospital admission reports for instance.  If it 
intervenes in respect of a child at low risk, and if this assessment was unreasonable 
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due to issues with the tool, then it will be acting outside its powers (not to mention 
reducing services to children at real risk of harm and causing unnecessary disruption 
and stress to the child and family).   
 
In this context, the work of Ribeiro, Singh and Guestrin is of interest.  Their 
experiment - in respect of classifiers that were trying to determine if a document was 
about Christianity or Atheism - used a dataset that, despite a high accuracy on 
validation data, contained features that did not generalise, and thus validation 
accuracy overestimated real world performance. [50]  When test set accuracy was 
used as a measure of trust in order to choose between two text classification models, 
users tended to select the worse classifier i.e. the classifier that despite achieving a 
high percentage accuracy rate, in fact had serious issues ‘in the wild’ due to the 
importance given to irrelevant words (such as ‘Posting’ and ‘Re’).  When individual 
prediction explanations were shown, however, it was possible for a human user with 
prior knowledge to see if a prediction was made for arbitrary reasons unconnected 
with the purpose of the prediction, and so take steps to improve an untrustworthy 
classifier. [50] 
 
Risk assessments and predictions   
Riberio et al.’s experiment was in respect of a definitional classification.  Risk 
assessments present more of a challenge to human judgement where, Meehl would 
have argued, human judgement does not represent a gold standard.  Non-expert 
users may struggle to understand the factors that contribute to the algorithm’s 
output, such as the ‘not-so-obvious words’ that contributed to the classification of 
pornographic websites in Martens and Provost’s work, [35] and therefore could be 
set up to fail if asked to decide upon relevance.   
This however brings us back to the potential disconnect regarding the meaning of 
‘relevance’.  In a public sector environment, relevance in a legal sense cannot be 
ignored and so neither can statistical relevance - and the risk of false generalisation -  
to this assessment.  Many lawyers will find themselves in the position of having to 
consider whether the results of a model satisfy a certain relevancy or evidentiary 
standard or whether use of a model with say, an 65% overall accuracy rate, satisfies a 
certain standard of care.  How should they decide whether statistical algorithmic risk 
predictors are ‘unreliable science’ [51] or in fact empirically valid in any one context? 
 
Their difficulties are only exacerbated by the ‘group-to-individual’ problem.  Melissa 
Hamilton argues that translating from the population, being the group level, to the 
individual level ‘is a precarious adventure fraught with errors; but many judges, 
practitioners, even forensic assessors, fail to notice.’ [51]  She points to misleading 
communications during sentencing decisions in the US in which group-based data was 
translated into absolute predictions of reoffending at an individual level.  Therefore, 
Hamilton argues, attention must be paid to the way that results of algorithmic tools 
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are communicated to decision-makers, with Hamilton advocating a comparative or 
analogous form of risk communication. 
 
Blastland and Spiegelhalter describe the challenge another way: ‘the average can be 
scarily predictable, but only at the right scale.  This is the scale of whole populations, 
boiled down and their essence extracted.  The problem is that this is not the scale on 
which individuals in all their variability live.’ [52]  Even Richard Berk has described his 
tool’s forecasted low risk offenders as ‘good bets’. [39]  In presentation of algorithmic 
results to the human user in practice, however, it may be less than clear that, as the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin pointed out in the Loomis case: ‘risk scores are intended 
to predict the general likelihood that those with a similar history of offending are 
either less likely or more likely to commit another crime following release from 
custody…the risk assessment does not predict the specific likelihood that an 
individual offender will reoffend.  Instead, it provides a prediction based on a 
comparison of information about the individual to a similar data group.’ [53]   
 
Pasquale and Cashwell point to the paramount importance of ‘meaning’ in rights 
determination, not factored into many predictive models. [32]  Indeed, there is 
increasing political pressure to consider ‘how unjustified correlations can be avoided 
when more meaningful causal relationships should be discernible’ with transparency 
proposed as a default when the algorithms in question affect the public. [54]  In 
terms of design solutions to these issues, counterfactual methods [26] and causal 
reasoning [55] have the potential to provide users with the information that they 
need to consider the defensibility of the output while not requiring expert knowledge 
around the statistical relevance of the input factors, provided that this information is 
provided at the point of result publication, not just in training.      
 
This is not to say that outputs of predictive algorithms automatically cross the line 
into irrelevance: risk assessment is an essential part of many public services.  Hofman, 
Sharma and Watts argue that ‘social scientists could benefit by paying more attention 
to predictive accuracy as a measure of explanatory power.’ [56]  A decision as to 
whether to refer someone onto a deferred prosecution scheme, such as that offered 
by Durham Constabulary, inevitably involves an assessment of risk - of ‘future 
dangerousness’ as Richard Berk would say – as well as a consideration of personal 
circumstances, something that could easily be a rather cloudy, hunch-based decision, 
not to mention a difficult one.  Could algorithmic risk assessment tools, as Blastland 
and Spiegelhalter put it, ‘work well enough to give…a practical steer’? [52]  Should it 
matter if the causal relationship is uncertain if a model is designed for circumstances 
when its ability to predict may be one of the important factors?  
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Predictive accuracy and extrinsic factors 
Hofman et al. point out the need to assess whether ‘predictive accuracy is subject to 
some fundamental limit’ because of dependence upon extrinsic random factors. [56]  
Such limits must be considered before determinations about an algorithm’s 
relevance, or otherwise, can be made. [57]  For instance, the national Domestic 
Violence Disclosure Scheme in the UK, known as Clare’s Law (named after Clare 
Wood who was murdered by her ex-boyfriend who had a history of violence towards 
women), has as its very heart an assessment of risk by the police, requiring them to 
make a judgement as to whether to disclose information about an individual to the 
person with whom they are forming a relationship. [58]  They can only do this if there 
is a ‘pressing need’ for that disclosure i.e. that the risk of harm reaches a certain level.  
There is potential for algorithmic tools to help officers to make ‘better bets’ or even 
improve the currently rather opaque decision-making process relating to this 
information sharing scheme.  The debate around the use of actuarial algorithmic 
tools could present an opportunity to clarify the sort of risks that would result in a 
‘pressing need’ for disclosure, and what factors should go into that assessment.  Of 
course, Clare’s law, and domestic violence in general, is a factually and emotionally 
complex sphere requiring a focus upon the (potential) victim as well as the 
perpetrator, and an appreciation that stark conviction and arrest data will not often 
present the full picture.   
    
Irrelevant considerations – reframing for algorithm-assisted decision-making in the 
public sector 
Eighteenth century Morgan would have appreciated this search for relevancy; his 
criticism of the pre-existing rule was based on its absurd results in the real world, its 
lack of ‘truth’, such as the probability of an 18 year old surviving one 78 year old 
being calculated as less than the 18 year old surviving two 78 year olds. [2]  The pre-
existing rule neither reflected observation nor common sense.  As Mulgan points out: 
‘Everything we know is knowledge from the past, which may not apply in the 
future – the problem repeatedly stumbled on by models, algorithms, economic 
theories, and geopolitical dispositions, which made sense in one era, but then 
become dysfunctional in another….And so the models we use to think can also 
become traps…intelligence has to be at war with and suspicious of itself to be 
truly intelligent.’ [59] 
But relevance is not an easy concept to define – it means different things to different 
people - and there seems to be much work to do to achieve understanding between 
the various disciplines involved in the creation, deployment and regulation of 
algorithms, and in particular to determine the defensibility of predictors which are 
key to predictive accuracy: ‘only people can decide which data points are appropriate 
to use in the first place.’ [34] 
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The second of my ‘re-framings’ does not attempt to solve this dilemma but instead to 
set out a number of factors that may need to be considered in an assessment of legal 
relevancy when an algorithm-assisted decision is in play:  
 
In deciding upon the relevance of an algorithmic output to a decision by a public 
sector body, the human decision-maker should consider inter alia a) the relevance of 
the input factors to the context of the decision, in particular whether they have an 
explainable and ultimately justifiable link to the purpose in hand;  b) the tool's 
performance and accuracy in the live environment; c) the relative importance of 
extrinsic external factors (those not factored into the algorithm) to the overall 
decision; and d) the level of uncertainty around causal relationships between the 
inputs and the prediction claimed.   
 
Improper delegation and fettering discretion 
Discretionary power is crucial for effective government: 'Relatively little can be done 
merely by passing Acts of Parliament.  There are far too many problems of detail, and 
far too many matters that cannot be decided in advance.' [19]  Discretionary power 
must be not abused, either by 'running amok' or by failing to exercise discretion 
appropriately.  There is a significant body of case-law dealing with improper 
delegation of powers allocated to a public body and ‘fettering’ of an organisation’s 
discretion when exercising powers.  Often Parliament has created a scheme, whereby 
it clearly intended that a particular person or body should make the decision in 
question, not the person to whom the discretion has been delegated. [60]  Regarding 
delegation, Wade & Forsyth explains that ‘the vital question in most cases is whether 
the statutory discretion remains in the hands of the proper authority, or whether 
some other person purports to exercise it.’ [19]  Improper delegation might include 
putting a decision ‘into the hands of a third person or body not possessed of statutory 
or constitutional authority’ [61] or abdicating powers, such as where the Home 
Secretary acted as a ‘rubber stamp’ on the advice of others without making his own 
decision. [62]  Where a public sector body is given an element of discretion, it must 
put its mind to the decision and not follow policy or other diktat blindly.  A general 
policy or rule is acceptable provided that, as Lord Reid said in British Oxygen, the 
authority does not refuse to listen at all. [63]  An administrative authority is not 
allowed to ‘pursue consistency at the expense of the merits of individual cases.’ [64]  
Hildebrandt sums up the importance of discretion to the application of decisions in 
the public sector affecting individual rights: ‘Discretion, rather than strict application 
of unbending rules, recognizes the fallibility of interfacing rules with their field of 
application.’ [33] 
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Fettering discretion and algorithms 
A public body whose staff come to rely unthinkingly upon an algorithmic result in the 
exercise of discretionary power could be illegally ‘fettering its discretion’ to an 
internal ‘home-grown’ algorithm, or be regarded as delegating decision-making 
illegally to an externally developed or externally run algorithm, or having pre-
determined its decision by surrendering its judgement.  Hildebrandt has used the 
term ‘judgmental atrophy’ to describe these outcomes [65] and notes that data-
driven architectures can ‘transform the environment we depend upon, while also 
transforming ourselves in the process.’ [24]  For the public sector, this must include 
the risk that the deployment of an algorithmic tool starts to change, or limit, the way 
that a decision is taken or an operation is carried out.  Karen Yeung describes being 
‘hypernudged’ in one direction, [66] a risk when an algorithmic output is expressed in 
very blunt un-nuanced terms (high, low and so on), and where the algorithm’s 
workings are opaque to the human user, thus bringing us back to the first principle 
discussed above.  Gary Kasparov says that ‘The problem comes when the database 
and the engine go from coach to oracle’. [67]  This reflects problems from an 
administrative law perspective which come when ‘the real discretion is being 
exercised by the body or person that recommends.’ [19]  Or in the algorithmic 
examples that we are considering, where the discretion has been delegated to the 
algorithm, and no genuine or conscious choice is being made by the public authority. 
 
The role of the human in an algorithm-assisted discretionary decision? 
An algorithm has the potential always to be more accurate than a human when 
circumstances are identical to that which the algorithm was developed, and in 
relation to that specific task or question for which the algorithm was designed 
(although accuracy levels may not present the full picture in circumstances where 
data uncertainty is not represented [49] or where there is no appetite for double-
blind testing, in respect of serious offenders for instance: see Kleinberg et al.’s work 
on comparing judicial bail decisions with an algorithmic one where crime outcomes 
can only be observed for released defendants [68]).  Grove and Meehl argue that ‘if 
an equation predicts that Jones will do well in dental school, and the dean’s 
committee, looking at the same set of facts, predicts that Jones will do poorly, it 
would be absurd to say, “The methods don’t compete, we use both of them.” One 
cannot decide both to admit and to reject the applicant; one is forced by the 
pragmatic context to do one or the other.’ [4]  It is hard to take issue with this.  It is 
the most accurate prediction that should be deployed, Grove and Meehl say, which 
may in many scenarios be the algorithmic one.  Where there were exceptions to the 
superiority of algorithmic assessment in various studies, it was argued that had the 
data that was available to the clinician been made available to the predictor, then the 
statistical predictor might have been equally or more accurate; the solution was to 
improve the model, rather than to combine human heads with the model. [4]  
Humans struggle to correct patterns of ineffective or biased decisions, often due to 
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the lack of meaningful feedback, whereas algorithms are specifically designed to 
learn through error. [4]   
 
Algorithms deployed in public sector environments will inevitably be limited in their 
data inputs, for legal, technical and policy reasons too numerous to explore here.  For 
instance, the HART tool deployed by Durham Constabulary to forecast risk of serious 
offending in the context of triaging offenders to an out-of-court disposal currently 
uses only data available in local constabulary systems, not data from neighbouring 
forces or available in other systems such as the Police National Computer.  In such 
circumstances, it is therefore the human decision-maker that will have the knowledge 
of factors that are not represented by inputs in the algorithm, including ‘procedural 
and tacit’ knowledge acquired from hands-on experiences and practice [69], or 
employment and family circumstances (as Kleinberg et al. acknowledge in their study 
[68]), social contacts, disability or mental health, the positive affect of interventions, 
the circumstances of the victim or community  or intelligence records, which 
commonly require human interpretation, perhaps of a link with organised crime not 
reflected in arrest, charge or conviction history.  They must be allowed to, and must 
be expected to, take all relevant factors into account, and to record how they do this.   
 
Improving a model with new factors 
But could not such factors be added to a model in order to improve it? Indeed they 
could, and in doing so the creators of algorithms inevitably need to ‘translate ‘real’ 
life events into machine readable data and programs’, [24] with potential 
consequences for the exercise of discretion.  First, factors such as family and social 
relationships, or impact of health conditions, are not easy to ‘datafy’ although the 
COMPAS tool appears to attempt to do so, based on the questions in the 
questionnaire presented to offenders. [70]  Hildebrandt states that ‘as with every 
translation, something gets lost’ [24] and there must be a risk that ‘datafication’ of 
such factors might change them into too simplistic a format.  Even if it appears that 
all relevant inputs have been captured, the human decision-maker must be alive to 
the relevance of those ‘lost’ elements.  Otherwise, it could be tantamount to the 
decision-making being brought forward to the technical stages of a system’s design. 
[5]  Furthermore, someone will always present with ‘factors’ that are relevant but for 
which the algorithm was not trained.  The human decision-maker must not refuse to 
exercise their discretion to consider such factors.   
 
Secondly, we cannot always assume that the forecast or classification represents the 
only or main factor on which the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of the overall decision is 
to be judged.  Doing so may risk changing the question that the public sector 
decision-maker has to answer.  Young Jones was admitted to dental school despite 
the algorithmic prediction that he would do poorly, and look he has done poorly, 
therefore the human decision was wrong.  But perhaps the University’s policy of 
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admitting candidates from deprived backgrounds outweighed the prediction at the 
time.  The offender was predicted to be medium risk by the algorithmic tool, but the 
police officer decided to release her on bail, and look she has reoffended, so the 
human decision was wrong.  But at the time of the decision, the offender was 
assessed to have strong family and community ties with a plan to address her drug 
problem.  The College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice’s risk principles 
state, ‘By definition, [operational] decisions involve uncertainty, ie, the likelihood and 
impact of possible outcomes cannot be totally predicted, and no particular outcome 
can be guaranteed.’  The principles go on to say ‘assessments of decisions should 
concentrate on whether they were reasonable and appropriate for the circumstances 
existing at the time.  If they were, the decision maker should not be blamed for a 
poor outcome.’ [71]  
 
The question to be answered 
Polson and Scott point out that ‘A machine can fit a model, but only people can use 
that model to ask the right questions.’ [34]  Questions and decisions based on risk, 
and legal concepts such as ‘reasonableness’, ‘public interest’ and opinions of 
necessity represent a challenge for algorithms and for feature engineering [34]: to 
produce a model that is genuinely able to reflect the complexity of individual 
circumstances, which apply to the multiple elements that may need to be considered, 
and which produce every choice of next steps that could reasonably apply to the 
decision(s) in question.  The UK’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act, for instance, 
states that a person shall be released after charge with or without bail unless the 
custody officer has ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that the detention of the 
person arrested is necessary to prevent him from committing an offence… to prevent 
him from causing physical injury to any other person or from causing loss of or 
damage to property… to prevent him from interfering with the administration of 
justice.’ [72]  Although risk of offending will be a relevant factor in this decision, it 
does not represent the question to be answered, which is whether there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that detention is necessary to prevent the offender 
from committing an offence and so on.   
 
Furthermore, as discussed above, the forecasts produced by many existing 
algorithmic tools are probabilities (that the person or situation in question has a 
certain similarity to people or situations in the past).  But they appear at times to be 
presented as something more: a prediction of reoffending becomes a ‘risk’ of 
reoffending and thus the risk if, say, a person is given parole.  Determinations of risk – 
a decision for the public body - may depend upon many considerations, including 
what is unknown and the impact of the thing that is predicted [52].  The point at 
which that determination is made, however, could inadvertently be moved back to 
the model-creators by the way that outputs are presented.     
 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 
available online at http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/376/2128/20170359. It is not the copy of record. Copyright ©  
2018, The Royal Society.
The extent to which algorithms ‘may shift the style of decision-making towards 
specific rules and away from professional judgement and discretion’ [7] (potentially in 
the process creating a challenge to the sovereignty of Parliament) is an area that 
requires further research within the practical environments in which algorithmic tools 
are implemented.   If in practice we see the tone set within a public body that an 
algorithm’s prediction must be followed, and thus the nature of the question to be 
answered changes, then I predict that, sooner rather than later, we will see a 
challenge based (partly) on a failure to consider the ‘merits of the case’ and a failure 
to consider other relevant factors.  If on the other hand they can be designed to be a 
genuine aid to a public sector decision-maker’s discretion, choices and professional 
judgement, without pushing the decision-maker towards a particular outcome, then 
there will be value.  People are influenced by how information is ‘framed.’ [73]  It is 
vital therefore that attention is paid to the human-algorithmic interface, together 
with the underlying organisational culture and processes to determine when a 
model’s forecasts should be overriden, to minimise the risk of ‘judgmental atrophy’ 
leading to improper delegation to an algorithm.  As Hartzog comments, ‘Design 
affects our expectations about how things work and the context within which we are 
acting.’ [74]  
 
Improper delegation and fettering discretion – reframing for algorithm-assisted 
decision-making in the public sector 
The third of my ‘re-framings’ therefore considers the preservation of appropriate 
discretion in algorithm-assisted environments: 
 
The decision-making process, of which the algorithmic tool is part, must preserve the 
human discretion to assess ‘un-thought of’ relevant factors, and to assess whether 
the question or decision is the one for which the algorithm was designed.  Algorithms 
should not be inserted into a process that requires the exercise of discretion by a 
public authority where the algorithm prevents that discretion; either because all of 
the factors relevant to the decision cannot be included, or required elements of the 
decision itself cannot be appropriately codified into, or by, the algorithm.   
 
Conclusion 
Cheney-Lippold, in his critique of our datafied culture, comments:  
‘We can think of a measurable type like ‘at risk’ as a hieroglyph, not a truth of 
identity but a priestly interpretation.  It is not simply an officer who decides our 
fate in any given encounter with the police.  Rather, it’s an algorithmic 
interpretation of our own, datafied social networks that enacts police 
suspicion.’ [75] 
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We might consider if this concern is anything new.  Our eighteenth century clergymen 
show us that attempting to draw conclusions or make predictions from data is not a 
modern phenomenon.  For our current society, however, it is surely the integration of 
(sometimes opaque) algorithmic conclusions and predictions into everyday life, 
powered by vast quantities of digital data, that creates both new opportunities and 
new challenges.  Much of the concern around the growing ubiquity of algorithms in 
society can be boiled down to two questions: how do they work, and are the 
decisions made using algorithms fair?  For centuries, English administrative law has 
been concerned with the fairness of state decisions.  Its principles are already tech-
agnostic.  It has tackled issues of transparency and understanding, the relevance of 
‘inputs’ and the protection of appropriate human discretion.  For lawyers, scientists 
and public sector practitioners alike, old law – interpreted in a new context - can help 
guide our algorithmic-assisted future. 
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